Based on years of archival research and interviews with the last surviving aides and Roosevelt Sometimes, it's TOO breezy, given the serious issues the author wants to deal with. 2. When it comes to Marshall and others who opposed Torch, Hamilton is certainly correct that FDR had a better sense of what the 1942 US military was capable of than the on-to-Berlin-immediately crowd, but he does not seem to understand that rather than them having been motivated by mere stubborn-ness or petulance, the military men were (I think) simply following the best military theory --don't divert resources to the periphery, concentrate your forces on the enemy's main force (Clausewitz, Jomini). 3. Some of the unusual sources are a bit off-point and perhaps unreliable.
Large swaths of Goebbels' diary are quoted. Daisy Suckley is interesting on FDR's personality, but not on grand strategy.In sum, this is an interesting read. Especially for those who can take it with a grain of salt. The author can't seem to decide how to integrate his two themes --what a great man FDR was personally in terms of moral vision and ability to motivate --with the grand strategy theme The book is very good and well worth buying and reading, but I had problems with it starting on the first page.In order to elevate FDR, the auhor states "...the military challenges facing Roosevelt as commander in chief were greater than any that had confronted his predecessors..." Well, we could argue all day about that. George Washington had a rabble of an army prone to desertion and defeat, a lack of funding from a weak government, and spent many hours pleading for supplies and food. Lincoln had the problem of a nation at war with itself. He had few troops at the beginning and had a hostile enemy force just a march from the nation's capital.Another problem here is that the 
